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NIX v. WILLIAMS AND THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY 
EXCEPTION: CREATION OF A LEGAL SAFETY NET 
TOM N. McINNIS* 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a legal system in which during a suppression hearing a prosecutor 
argued: “Your Honor, I am sorry to say that our police are so unprofessional 
that they did indeed knowingly and purposely violate the defendant’s 
constitutional rights.  Despite this fact, this same police force is just 
professional enough that clearly if the officers had not violated the defendant’s 
constitutional rights, members of the force would have found the same 
evidence through legal means, so it should be admitted.”  In her desire to get 
the judge to rule in favor of admitting the evidence, the prosecutor continued 
and explained, “Furthermore, your Honor, due to the freezing temperatures that 
existed in between the time that the evidence was illegally found and when it 
would have been eventually legally found, the evidence would have been in the 
same condition when it was legally discovered.”  Imagine the prosecutor then, 
after having convinced the judge to allow use of the evidence, reversing her 
position at trial by arguing and introducing evidence to demonstrate that the 
same freezing temperatures would have destroyed, not preserved, the crucial 
admitted evidence.  The 1984 case of Nix v. Williams1 gave credence to the 
scenario that has just been described.  In that case, the Supreme Court first 
gave its support to the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule.2  
This exception allows the prosecution to make use of evidence that was 
illegally gathered when a judge can be convinced by a preponderance of the 
evidence at a suppression hearing that the evidence would have been found 
through alternative legal means.3 
 
* B.A. 1980 Chadron State College, M.A. 1986 University of Missouri-Columbia, Ph.D. 1989 
University of Missouri-Columbia.  I would like to thank the editors and staff members of the 
Saint Louis University School of Law Public Law Review for their dedicated work in bringing 
this article and edition to fruit.  Thanks also go out to Jim Hawk for providing insight for most of 
my life and Jan, as always, for hanging with me. 
 1. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). 
 2. Id. at 444. 
 3. Id. 
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Nix v. Williams was the last time the Supreme Court provided any 
explanation of the inevitable discovery exception.  In the twenty-five years 
since Nix was decided, a pattern has developed in which every few years, legal 
scholars try to determine whether the inevitable discovery exception should 
apply to new factual scenarios.  In these articles the authors analyze the Nix 
decision, apply its principles and logic to recommend a course of action, and 
end with a call for the Supreme Court to provide clarity.4  While these analyses 
are well-intentioned and demonstrate a desire to make the application of the 
inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule principled, they lack an 
understanding of how the complexity of the Nix case helps to reveal the 
underlying reason behind the Court’s adoption of the exception.  This is not 
surprising because the appellate record of the case fails to adequately 
demonstrate the twists and turns of the Williams case.5  A review of the 
appellate record of the case makes it seem that Nix v. Williams was a perfect 
case for the Court to adopt the inevitable discovery exception.  That is because 
the case involved a person who all members of the Court thought to be guilty 
of a horrendous crime and that no one wanted to see released.6  The facts in the 
record also seem to have left no doubt that the evidence in question would 
 
 4. See, e.g., Jessica Forbes, Note, The Inevitable Discovery Exception, Primary Evidence, 
and the Emasculation of the Fourth Amendment, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 1221 (1987) (arguing for 
clarification regarding whether the exception applied to primary evidence); Troy E. Golden, Note, 
The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine Today: The Demands of the Fourth Amendment, Nix, and 
Murray, and the Disagreement Among the Federal Circuits, 13 BYU J. PUB. L. 97 (1998) 
(arguing that for clarification of the primary evidence debate, the warrant requirement debate, and 
the active pursuit debate); Stephen E. Hessler, Note, Establishing Inevitability Without Active 
Pursuit: Defining the Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary 
Rule, 99 MICH. L. REV. 238 (2000) (arguing for clarification as to whether an active alternative 
method of discovery is necessary); R. Bradley Lamberth, Comment, The Inevitable Discovery 
Doctrine: Procedural Safeguards to Ensure Inevitability, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 129 (1988) 
(arguing for clarification regarding cases where police have bypassed probable cause and warrant 
requirements); Jason Liljestrom, Note, Lawful to the World: Protecting the Integrity of the 
Inevitable Discovery Doctrine, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 177 (2006) (arguing for clarification of the 
lawful means requirement); David A. Stuart, Note, A Sign-Post Without Any Sense of Direction: 
The Supreme Court’s Dance Around the Inevitable Discovery Doctrine and the Exclusionary 
Rule in Hudson v. Michigan, 27 PACE. L. REV. 503 (2007) (arguing for clarification of 
warrantless searches). 
 5. Robert Williams was twice convicted of first degree murder.  The first time the 
conviction was overturned due to a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in Brewer 
v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).  His second conviction was upheld in Nix, 467 U.S. at 437–40.  
For a more complete history of the Williams case, see generally THOMAS N. MCINNIS, THE 
CHRISTIAN BURIAL CASE: AN INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE (2001). 
 6. See infra pp. 281–86. 
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have been found legally had it not first been found through a violation of 
Williams’s constitutional rights.7 
The purpose of this article is to document the crime and trials of Robert 
Anthony Williams to illustrate the issues leading to the Court’s adoption of the 
inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule.  An examination of the 
entire Williams case demonstrates that in its exuberance to create an exception 
to the exclusionary rule, the Court either misunderstood the complexities of the 
case or ignored them.  A full examination of the record helps to reveal that the 
Court adopted and made use of the inevitable discovery exception as a legal 
safety net to insure that individuals like Robert Anthony Williams would not 
be released due to the application of the exclusionary rule.  Understanding that 
the creation of a legal safety net was the ultimate purpose behind the adoption 
of the exclusionary rule also helps to explain why the Court has been hesitant 
to clarify the parameters of the inevitable discovery exception. 
This article is divided into four sections.  Section I explains the crime 
which Robert Anthony Williams was convicted of committing.  Section II 
examines the first trial and appeals process.  Section III examines Williams’s 
second trial and appeals process.  Finally, Section IV concludes that, despite 
calls for action, the Court is not likely to provide clarification of the inevitable 
discovery exception.  This is because the Court’s purpose was to create a legal 
safety net to insure that criminals who commit heinous crimes do not go free 
due to the operation of the exclusionary rule. 
I.  THE CRIME 
On December 24, 1968, the Powers family, consisting of Mr. and Mrs. 
Merlin Powers, their fifteen-year-old daughter, Vickie, fourteen-year-old son, 
Mark, and ten-year-old daughter, Pamela, went to a wrestling tournament on 
the second floor of the Y.M.C.A. building at 101 Locust Street in Des Moines, 
Iowa.8  The family was there to cheer on Mark, who was participating in the 
tournament.9  While there, Pamela received permission to go wash her hands 
before eating a candy bar.10  After five minutes, Mr. and Mrs. Powers checked 
on Pamela.  When Pamela could not be found in the washroom, they looked 
elsewhere.  According to Mr. Powers, they “started looking everywhere, 
 
 7. No court throughout the trial or appeals process ruled that the evidence would not have 
been lawfully discovered had it not been first discovered through a constitutional violation. 
 8. Nick Lamberto, ‘Y’ Aides Try to Stop Man with Bundle, DES MOINES REG., Dec. 25, 
1968, at 1. 
 9. Transcript of Trial at 24, Iowa v. Williams, No. CR 55805 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Polk County 
1977) [hereinafter Trial Transcript]. 
 10. Id. at 25–26. 
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knocking on doors, yelling her name.”11  The family continued its search for 
about twenty minutes and then called the police.12 
Shortly before 1:30 p.m., while Mr. and Mrs. Powers continued searching 
for Pamela, John Knapp, a security officer who worked for the Y.M.C.A., 
observed a resident of the Y.M.C.A. walk into the lobby carrying a blanket 
wrapped around something.13  Knapp, who didn’t know that Pamela Powers 
was missing, thought that the man was trying to skip out without paying rent, 
and asked him what he was carrying.14  The man answered a mannequin.15  
Knapp, together with Don Hanna, the physical education director at the 
Y.M.C.A., followed the man to the outside door.16  Knapp and Hanna failed to 
catch up with the man because Kevin Sanders, a fourteen-year-old boy, opened 
the door to let the man leave the Y.M.C.A.17  Sanders also opened the door to a 
car that was waiting at the curb.  Sanders later told police that when the man 
set the bundle in the car the blanket was pulled back and it exposed “skinny 
white legs.”18  Williams then drove off. 
When police arrived to investigate Pamela’s disappearance, she was 
described as being four feet, nine inches tall, weighing sixty-three pounds, with 
blonde hair, and blue eyes.19  She had been wearing an orange, striped blouse 
and orange slacks.20  As a result of John Knapp’s information, suspicion soon 
focused on Robert Anthony Williams, who Knapp identified as the man who 
had suspiciously left the Y.M.C.A.21  Williams had been living at the 
Y.M.C.A. since October 26, 1968.22  The case was then assigned to Captain 
Cleatus Leaming.  Leaming was Chief of Detectives and a nineteen-year 
veteran of the Des Moines Police Department.23  Leaming instructed the police 
to search the entire Y.M.C.A., giving special attention to the room of Robert 
Williams, the primary suspect.24  The police were unsuccessful in their attempt 
to locate Pamela Powers in the Y.M.C.A.  There was no indication that a 
struggle had taken place in Williams’s room, but they had removed Williams’s 
 
 11. Lamberto, supra note 8, at 3. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Trial Transcript, supra note 9, at 135–38. 
 14. Lamberto, supra note 8, at 3. 
 15. Trial Transcript, supra note 9, at 140. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 140–41. 
 18. Id. at 34. 
 19. Jerry Knight & James Ney, Search For Suspect At Davenport, DES MOINES REG., Dec. 
26, 1968, at 1. 
 20. Trial Transcript, supra note 9, at 25 
 21. Lamberto, supra note 8, at 3. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
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clothes and personal property.  Detective Leaming reported that it could not be 
determined whether Pamela Powers had been taken to Williams’s room.25 
On December 24, 1968, an arrest warrant was issued for Robert Williams 
on the charge of child stealing.26  On Christmas Day, Williams’s car was found 
in Davenport, Iowa.27  Davenport, Iowa is 160 miles east of Des Moines on 
Interstate 80.28  That same day at a rest stop on Interstate 80 near Grinnell, 
about forty miles east of Des Moines, a maintenance man found in a garbage 
can a pair of orange stretch slacks, which were later identified as Pamela’s, a 
white bobby sock, a man’s shirt, a pair of men’s trousers with the name 
“Anthony” sewn on the inside, a handkerchief, and a Y.M.C.A. blanket.29  The 
Iowa Highway Patrol searched along the interstate checking all the rest stops, 
culverts, overpasses, bridges and ditches.30  The search of the interstate was 
complicated by weather conditions, which included falling snow, blowing 
snow, and near-zero temperatures.31  The highway patrol confirmed, “We’re 
looking for the girl’s body.”32 
As the search for Pamela Powers and Robert Williams continued, police 
began to investigate Williams’s background.  They learned that Williams, who 
was twenty-four years old, was from Kansas City, Missouri, and had at least 
fourteen different arrests under a half-dozen aliases.33  His police record 
included auto theft, writing bogus checks, molestation, attempted rape, and 
statutory rape involving several underage girls.34  Police further discovered that 
Williams was an escapee from the Fulton State Hospital in Fulton, Missouri.35  
He had been committed to that facility after being declared guilty by reason of 
insanity in the rape of two Kansas City, Missouri girls who were ages eight and 
six.36  Williams had escaped from the facility in July of 1968.37 
Des Moines police also familiarized themselves with Williams’s activities 
after arriving in Des Moines.38  They discovered that he was a licensed 
minister at the Maple Street Baptist Church, which he had joined in late July.  
Rev. G.H. Parrish, who was the ordained minister at the church, licensed 
 
 25. Id. at 1. 
 26. Lamberto, supra note 8, at 3. 
 27. Appendix at 24, Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (No. 74-1263) [hereinafter 
Appendix]. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Knight & Ney, supra note 19. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 7. 
 32. Id. at 1. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Knight & Ney, supra note 19, at 1, 7. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 7. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
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Williams as a preacher in August.39  Rev. Parrish explained that Williams 
assisted around the church by playing the piano and organ for the junior and 
senior choirs, reading devotions during services, shoveling snow, and 
preaching three or four times.40 
When Williams arrived in Davenport on Christmas Eve, he went to the 
home of an old friend, Mrs. Sadie Wakefield Cade, who was unaware of the 
manhunt.41  On the morning of December 26, Williams, who was then in Rock 
Island, Illinois, called Henry McKnight, a Des Moines attorney.42  Williams 
knew McKnight from church related activities and asked McKnight for help.  
McKnight replied that he would help if Williams gave himself up.43  McKnight 
made one other condition.  He told Williams, “You must give me the facts 
about the girl when you get here.”44  McKnight advised Williams to return to 
Iowa and give himself up.  McKnight then called the police department at 
Davenport to inform them of Williams’s intention to surrender.45  Williams 
arrived at the Davenport Police Station at about 8:40 a.m., December 26, 
1968.46 
After talking to Williams, McKnight went to the Des Moines Police 
Department to discuss William’s transportation back to Des Moines.  After his 
arrest, Williams called McKnight at the Des Moines Police Department.47  
McKnight took the call in the presence of Chief of Police Wendell Nichols and 
Detective Cleatus Leaming.  During the call, McKnight explained that 
Williams would be picked up in Davenport by the Des Moines police and 
transported to Des Moines.48  McKnight also stated that during the trip 
Williams would not be mistreated or grilled, and that he should make no 
statement until he reached Des Moines and they had a chance to consult.49 
After surrendering, Williams was booked and given his Miranda 
warnings.50  During Williams’s initial appearance, a state court judge notified 
him of the charges against him and again gave him his Miranda warnings.51  
While at the courtroom, Williams conferred with Thomas Kelly, a Davenport 
 
 39. Knight & Ney, supra note 19, at 7. 
 40. Id. 
 41. David Eastman, Tells of Visit by Williams in Davenport, DES MOINES REG., Dec. 27, 
1968, at 3. 
 42. Nick Lamberto, Open Charge of Murder Filed Here, DES MOINES REG., Dec. 27, 1968, 
at 1.  
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 8.  
 46. Id. 
 47. Lamberto, supra note 42, at 8.  
 48. Appendix, supra note 27, at 38. 
 49. Id. at 36–38. 
 50. Id. at 49. 
 51. Id. at 50. 
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attorney, who advised him to say nothing until he had a chance to consult with 
McKnight upon return to Des Moines.52 
After the discussion between McKnight and the Des Moines police, 
Detective Leaming and Detective Arthur Nelson, a fifteen-year police veteran, 
drove to Davenport to pick up Williams.53  Around 1:00 p.m. they had a 
conversation with Thomas Kelly and Williams.  Detective Leaming again gave 
Williams his Miranda warnings and explained that the two of them would be 
“visiting” on the way back to Des Moines.54 
Kelly, acting as Williams’s attorney, conferred privately with Williams.55  
Kelly and Leaming then had a discussion, the results of which were a point of 
disagreement at trial.  The first point of disagreement was that Kelly believed 
he had received assurances from Leaming that Williams was not to be 
questioned until after he was returned to Des Moines and had the chance to 
consult with McKnight.56  Kelly also claimed that he was denied permission to 
ride along with Williams and the detectives in the police car to Des Moines.57  
The two detectives placed Williams in the backseat of the car and left on the 
160-mile trip to Des Moines.58  Williams never expressed a willingness to be 
interrogated during the trip.  In fact, he told Detective Leaming that he would 
talk after they returned to Des Moines and he consulted with McKnight.59 
On the way back Leaming engaged Williams in a number of conversations 
on topics including religion, Williams’s reputation, his minister, and police 
procedures.60  Leaming told Williams that he himself had religious training as 
a child and was more likely to pray for Williams than abuse him or strike 
him.61  In an effort to obtain statements from Williams concerning the missing 
girl, Leaming later testified that he addressed Williams as “Reverend” and 
went into what has become known as the “Christian burial speech.”62  The 
speech goes as follows: 
I want to give you something to think about while we’re traveling down the 
road. . . . Number one, I want you to observe the weather conditions, it’s 
raining, it’s sleeting, it’s freezing, driving is very treacherous, visibility is poor, 
it’s going to be dark early this evening.  They are predicting several inches of 
snow for tonight, and I feel that you yourself are the only person that knows 
 
 52. Id. at 50–52. 
 53. Appendix, supra note 27, at 54–55. 
 54. Id. at 75. 
 55. Id. at 75–76. 
 56. Id. at 91.  
 57. Id. at 107–08. 
 58. Appendix, supra note 27, at 77. 
 59. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 392 (1977). 
 60. Appendix, supra note 27, at 81. 
 61. Id. at 80. 
 62. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 392. 
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where this little girl’s body is, that you yourself have only been there once, and 
if you get a snow on top of it you yourself may be unable to find it.  And, since 
we will be going right past the area on the way into Des Moines, I feel that we 
could stop and locate the body, that the parents of this little girl should be 
entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl who was snatched away from 
them on Christmas [E]ve and murdered.  And I feel we should stop and locate 
it on the way in rather than waiting until morning and trying to come back out 
after a snow storm and possibly not being able to find it at all.63 
Williams asked Detective Leaming why he believed that they were going to go 
past the body.64  In an attempt to induce Williams to divulge the location of the 
body Leaming falsely told him that he knew it was somewhere near 
Mitchellville.65 
While Williams was being arrested, making his initial appearance, and 
readied for transport, the police had begun a more intensive search for the body 
of Pamela Powers.  The focus of the new search was based on the discovery of 
Williams’s car in Davenport and the clothing belonging to Williams and the 
victim found at the rest stop on Interstate 80 near Grinnell, Iowa.66  The police 
had concluded that the body of Pamela Powers would probably be found near 
the interstate between Des Moines and Grinnell.67 
Thomas Ruxlow of the Iowa Bureau of Criminal Investigation was in 
charge of the search, which was conducted by about 200 persons.68  The first 
step of the search involved obtaining maps of Jasper and Poweshiek Counties, 
which are east of Polk County where Des Moines is located.  These two 
counties are divided in half by Interstate 80, so the decision was made to 
search an area from roughly seven miles north of the interstate to seven miles 
south of the interstate.  The section to be searched was divided into grids with 
responsibility for each grid placed on teams containing between four to six 
volunteers.69  The searchers were instructed to check all roads and ditches from 
the roadbed.  When the searchers came upon culverts, they were told to get out 
of their vehicle and check the insides.  Searchers were also instructed to 
examine abandoned farm buildings and any other places where a small child 
could be hidden.70  The search began at the eastern border of Poweshiek 
County and moved west.71 
 
 63. Id. at 392–93. 
 64. Appendix, supra note 27, at 81. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Transcript of Motions to Suppress Evidence at 35, Iowa v. Williams, No. CR 55805 
(Iowa Dist. Ct. Polk County 1977) [hereinafter Suppression Hearing]. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 33–34. 
 69. Id. at 34. 
 70. Id. at 35. 
 71. Suppression Hearing, supra note 66, at 36. 
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As Williams and his escorts neared Grinnell, Iowa, Williams asked if the 
victim’s shoes had been found.72  Without reminding Williams of his rights, 
Detective Leaming told Williams what evidence had been found.  Williams 
then stated that he would show the detectives where he had hidden the shoes 
but, upon stopping at the gas station, no shoes could be located.73  After further 
discussion, Williams offered to lead the detectives to a blanket at a rest stop 
but, when they stopped, they found out that it had already been discovered.74 
As they continued toward Des Moines, there were further discussions 
about people, religion, intelligence, and what people thought about Williams.  
While they were still some distance east of Mitchellville, Williams told the 
detectives that he would show them where the body was located.75  When it 
was clear that Williams seemed to be cooperating, the search for Pamela 
Powers was called off at 3:00 p.m. on December 26.76  During the period in 
which the search was active, it had covered all of Jasper and Poweshiek 
Counties, and had made it to the Jasper-Polk County line.77  The search was 
never resumed because at about 5:45 p.m., Williams led the police to the body, 
which was located in Polk County, two and a half miles west of the Jasper 
County line.  The location was on a gravel road two miles south of Interstate 
80.  It took officers five minutes to discover the body once Williams led them 
to the site, but they did find it.78  The body was dressed in an orange and white 
striped blouse, which is what first attracted the attention of the officers 
searching.  From the waist down, the body had no clothes.  It was partially 
covered with snow, with the left leg frozen in midair and the back resting 
against a cement culvert.79  One officer on the scene said that due to the recent 
snow it would have taken a “long time” to find the body without Williams’s 
cooperation.80 
Williams then arrived in Des Moines at about 7:30 p.m.81  McKnight, who 
was at the station, stated that the Des Moines police “really double-crossed me. 
They violated all the gentlemen’s agreements we had.”82  McKnight also said 
that, according to Williams, the officers on the trip back kept questioning him 
 
 72. Appendix, supra note 27, at 81. 
 73. Id., at 82–83. 
 74. Id. at 83–84. 
 75. Id. at 84. 
 76. Suppression Hearing, supra note 66, at 36. 
 77. Id. 
 78. State v. Williams (Williams II), 285 N.W.2d 248, 261–62 (Iowa 1979). 
 79. Suppression Hearing, supra note 66, at 22–23. 
 80. Lamberto, supra note 42, at 8. 
 81. Id. at 3.  
 82. Williams ‘Voluntarily Told’ Where Body Was: Police, DES MOINES REG., Dec, 28, 1968, 
at 5 [hereinafter Voluntarily Told]. 
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as to the location of the body until he cooperated.83  Police Chief Nichols, 
however, stood up for his officers, stating that, “The two officers who brought 
Williams back from Davenport deliberately refrained from asking him for 
details of the abduction and slaying.”84 
II.  THE FIRST TRIAL AND APPEALS 
A. Pretrial Hearing 
Prior to trial, a motion was filed on March 25, 1969, to suppress 
evidence.85  The motion asked Judge James Denato to “suppress the State’s 
evidence offered by all witnesses as to admissions against interest, statements, 
demonstrations and confessions made by him [Williams] while in police 
custody on an automobile trip from Davenport to Des Moines, Iowa, on 
December 26, 1968.”86  The motion also requested that all the State’s evidence 
that was linked to those violations be suppressed.  This evidence would include 
the body and all physical evidence found at the site where the body was 
located.  The motion argued that the evidence should be suppressed because it 
was gathered in violation of the Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as made 
applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.87 
Judge Denato held a suppression hearing on April 2, 1969.88  In making his 
decision, Judge Denato had to decide whether there had been agreement not to 
question Williams on the trip from Davenport back to Des Moines between 
McKnight and Detective Leaming.  He also had to determine if Detective 
Leaming had intermittently questioned Williams about the location of the body 
on the trip back to Des Moines, which Detective Leaming denied.  Finally, 
Judge Denato had to determine whether Leaming had denied Kelly permission 
to ride with Williams to Des Moines.89 
Judge Denato ruled that the trip from Davenport to Des Moines was a 
critical stage in the proceedings against Williams which required, if requested, 
the presence of counsel in order for the evidence gained to be admissible.90  
Judge Denato also ruled that the facts showed that there was an agreement 
 
 83. Appendix, supra note 27, at 48. 
 84. Voluntarily Told, supra note 82, at 1. 
 85. Appendix, supra note 27, at 1. 
 86. State v. Williams (Williams I), 182 N.W.2d 396, 398–99 (1970); Appendix, supra note 
27, at 1. 
 87. Appendix, supra note 27, at 2–3. 
 88. Id. at 1–2. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 1. 
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between McKnight and the Des Moines police that Williams would not talk to 
the police until after he had consulted with McKnight.91  Judge Denato then 
ruled that regardless of any agreement, no evidence resulting from the trip 
would be suppressed. Judge Denato believed that Williams had been 
adequately informed of his rights, understood them and voluntarily gave 
information to the police after waiving his right to have an attorney present.  In 
the words of Judge Denato:  
The time element involved on the trip, the general circumstances of it, and 
more importantly the absence on the Defendant’s part of any assertion of his 
right or desire not to give information absent the presence of his attorney, are 
the main foundations for the Court’s conclusion that he voluntarily waived 
such right.92 
Although Judge Denato did not decide either of the two remaining factual 
questions because they were made irrelevant by the ruling that Williams had 
waived his rights, Judge Denato did shed some light on what he believed to be 
an accurate reflection of one of the issues by stating, “the Court is not entirely 
convinced that Chief of Detectives Leaming testified with complete candor at 
this hearing, regarding the ‘agreement’ with Defendant’s attorney.”93  Judge 
Denato added that all of his findings were made “beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”94  The effect of Judge Denato’s ruling was that it allowed all the 
evidence in question to be admissible. 
B. The Trial 
The first trial of Robert Williams began on April 30, 1969.  In making the 
case for the prosecution, assistant Polk County Attorney, Vincent Hanrahan, 
used nine witnesses to create an historical storyline to explain the sequence of 
events surrounding the disappearance of Pamela Powers.95  Those called to 
testify either had direct knowledge of Pamela’s disappearance or Williams’s 
flight.96  Because the defense did not dispute the prosecution’s version of these 
events, McKnight did not cross-examine the witnesses.  Another group of 
prosecution witnesses included several of the police officers involved in the 
case.97 The most important witness for the State was Detective Cleatus 
Leaming. Detective Leaming testified about the long sequence of events 
involving him and Williams, which took place on December 26, 1968.98  
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Detective Leaming again repeated the Christian burial speech that he believed 
caused Williams to lead him to places where evidence had been disposed and 
eventually, the body.99  The final witness called by the State was Dr. Leo Luka, 
the Polk County Medical Examiner.100  Dr. Luka testified that the autopsy 
revealed that Pamela had been subject to a sexual assault and that she had been 
smothered to death.101  This piece of information was crucial to the State’s 
ability to prove the elements of first degree murder.  The State then rested its 
case. 
The defense, presented by Henry McKnight, involved the testimony of 
three witnesses.  It lasted one hour and ten minutes.102  The only witness that 
was called to provide exculpatory testimony was Dorothy Brown, a maid at the 
Y.M.C.A.  She testified that she saw Williams and Arthur Bowers, a Y.M.C.A. 
janitor, get on the seventh floor elevator at about 1:45 on the afternoon of 
December 24.103  This was a full fifteen minutes to half hour after the 
prosecution’s witness had placed Williams as leaving the Y.M.C.A.104  She 
also stated that Williams was not carrying a bundle in a blanket.105 
The other witnesses were used to illustrate the extent to which Williams’s 
rights to counsel and against self-incrimination had been violated on the drive 
between Davenport and Des Moines.106  McKnight called Thomas Kelly, the 
attorney who had counseled Williams in Davenport.  McKnight also called Des 
Moines Police Chief Wendell Nichols.  Chief Nichols testified that both he and 
Detective Leaming were in Leaming’s office with McKnight on December 26 
when McKnight received a call from Williams.107 
In his closing argument, Vincent Hanrahan said, “All I’m going to talk 
about is the first degree because I see nothing else in this case.”108  Hanrahan 
explained that this was the only possible verdict because it was first degree 
murder when an individual was killed during the act of rape.109  He noted that 
according to the testimony of Polk County Medical Examiner, Dr. Leo Luka, 
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Pamela had been violated.110  Hanrahan reviewed the events, which showed 
that Williams was seen carrying a body out of the Y.M.C.A.111  He also 
reminded the jury that only the murderer would have known where the body 
was located, and that the evidence showed Williams himself had led police to 
the body.112 
McKnight reminded the jurors that Williams was an escapee from a mental 
hospital at the time when the events occurred.  McKnight explained that this 
might have caused Williams to carry Pamela’s body out of the Y.M.C.A. rather 
than report the killing.113  He told the jurors that Williams’s actions did not 
prove he committed the murder.  McKnight implied that the evidence not 
presented at the trial might be as important as that which was presented.  In 
particular, some witnesses, like Albert Bowers, who had seen Williams the day 
of the crime were not called by the prosecution.114  McKnight wondered why 
the police questioned Bowers and then let him leave the State without getting 
any address where he could be located for the purpose of the trial.115  
McKnight also questioned why the prosecutor had failed to mention any of the 
laboratory tests that were done on Pamela’s clothing and the items found in the 
Grinnell rest stop.116  He also questioned why police had not entered into 
evidence hairs that were taken from Williams for the purpose of comparison to 
“foreign” hairs that were found on Pamela’s body.117 
In the case of Iowa v. Williams, the verdict was announced in open court 
on May 6, 1969.  The jury did not spend much time deliberating the case.  
They began their deliberation at noon.  While they deliberated, the jurors 
elected Norbert Moreland as their foreman and ordered and ate lunch.  It 
returned with a verdict at 1:40 p.m.118  The verdict was guilty of first degree 
murder. 
C. The First Appeals Process 
After Williams’s conviction, Henry T. McKnight filed an appeal on behalf 
of Williams before the Iowa Supreme Court.  In his brief, he argued that 
Williams’s conviction should be reversed due to violations of Miranda v. 
Arizona119 and because the trial court had erred in overruling his motion to 
suppress the evidence resulting from the automobile trip between Davenport 
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and Des Moines while Williams was in police custody.120  On December 15, 
1970, the Iowa Supreme Court issued its opinion in the case of Iowa v. 
Williams.121  The court upheld the conviction of Williams in a 5-4 decision.  In 
his majority opinion, Justice Larson first pointed out that almost all protections 
of the Constitution, including the right to counsel and the privilege against 
self-incrimination, may be waived by a citizen.  After warned of his rights, a 
person may waive those rights when he is not in the presence of an attorney.122  
The court then indicated that it could determine if there was a waiver by 
examining the totality of the circumstances.123  In examining the totality of the 
circumstances from the record, the court ruled that Williams had effectively 
waived his rights and volunteered statements concerning the whereabouts of 
the victim’s body.124 
On October 12, 1972, Williams filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, against Lou 
Brewer, the warden of the Iowa State Penitentiary at Fort Madison, where he 
was imprisoned.125  The case of Williams v. Brewer was heard by district court 
Judge William C. Hanson.126  Judge Hanson ruled that Williams’s statements 
were not voluntary,127 that he had not properly waived his Fifth Amendment 
rights as required in Miranda,128 and that there was a further violation of Sixth 
Amendment rights by interrogating him without his counsel after judicial 
proceedings had already began.129  As a result, Judge Hanson ruled that 
Williams’s statements should not have been admitted into evidence at trial 
where they were prejudicial against Williams.130  The State then appealed to 
the Eighth Circuit.131 
On December 31, 1974, the Eighth Circuit reached a decision in Williams 
v. Brewer.132  The decision was split 2-1.133  In resolving the legal issues Judge 
Vogel, speaking for the panel, affirmed the district court’s decision.134  Judge 
Vogel ruled that there was no waiver because only after the subtle form of 
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interrogation, through the Christian burial speech, was the State capable of 
eliciting from Williams’s statements after he had asserted his rights.135 
On December 15, 1975, the Supreme Court voted to grant the State’s 
request for certiorari.136  In its brief, the State, along with twenty-one other 
states acting as amici curiae, urged the Court to re-examine and overrule 
Miranda v. Arizona.137  On March 23, 1977, the Supreme Court handed down 
its decision in Brewer v. Williams.138  In a 5-4 decision, the Court upheld the 
district court’s grant of habeas corpus to Williams.139  Justice Potter Stewart 
wrote the majority opinion.140  Justice Stewart declared that the central issue 
was whether Williams’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel as applied to the 
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had been 
violated.141  The Court found that Williams’s rights had been violated because 
it was clear that judicial proceedings had begun against Williams prior to the 
trip from Davenport to Des Moines.142  As a result, Justice Stewart believed 
that Massiah v. United States143 was the applicable precedent.144  Williams was 
therefore entitled to the assistance of counsel during the trip.145  Justice Stewart 
rejected the totality of circumstances standard applied by the Iowa Supreme 
Court to demonstrate waiver.146  He stated that Johnson v. Zerbst147 was the 
standard to judge if a waiver existed, so the State had to prove “an intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,” which the State 
was unable to establish in Williams’s situation.148 
Justice Stewart’s opinion also included a footnote, which is indicative of 
the Court’s likely displeasure with the social costs of the application of the 
exclusionary rule in this case.  In the footnote, Justice Stewart indicated the 
Court’s willingness for the State to test the development of a new exception to 
the exclusionary rule by stating: 
While neither Williams’ incriminating statements themselves nor any 
testimony describing his having led the police to the victim’s body can 
constitutionally be admitted into evidence, evidence of where the body was 
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found and of its condition might well be admissible on the theory that the body 
would have been discovered in any event, even had incriminating statements 
not been elicited from Williams. . . . In the event that a retrial is instituted, it 
will be for the state courts in the first instance to determine whether particular 
items of evidence may be admitted.149 
Through this footnote and an unwillingness to directly discuss which evidence 
should have been suppressed due to the violation of Williams’s Sixth 
Amendment rights, the Supreme Court put into motion a sequence of events 
that would delay the final resolution of the Williams case for seven more years. 
Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion in which he explained that 
although he generally shared “the view that the per se application of the 
exclusionary rule has little to commend it,” he thought it should be applied in 
this case because Officer Leaming had purposely violated Williams’s rights.150 
Chief Justice Burger wrote a dissenting opinion, the tone of which was set 
by the first few sentences.151  Chief Justice Burger complained that Williams 
was undoubtedly guilty of a horrendous crime, and that no member of the 
Court suggested he was not.152  The bulk of Chief Justice Burger’s dissent was 
then directed at discrediting the Court’s application of the exclusionary rule.153 
He argued that rather than automatically exclude evidence, the Court should 
have balanced the harm exclusion does to the truth seeking process of a trial 
with the imperative to safeguard constitutional rights.154 
III.  THE SECOND TRIAL AND APPEALS 
A. Pretrial Hearing 
Prior to his second trial, again presided over by Judge Denato, Williams’s 
attorneys made several motions to suppress evidence.  The most important of 
the suppression motions was the desire to suppress all of Williams’s statements 
during the trip between Davenport and Des Moines, which the Supreme Court 
had ruled resulted from a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  
Included in this motion was a request to suppress all evidence gathered as a 
result of the tainted statements, including “articles of clothing, and 
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photographs of articles of clothing, found on the body, evidence concerning the 
condition of the body, and the results of medical, chemical, or pathological 
tests performed on the body.”155  The defense also sought to suppress hair 
samples that had been taken from Williams while he was being held at the Polk 
County Jail.156 
The suppression hearing was held on May 31, 1977, before Judge 
Denato.157  Both sides had specific things they were hoping to prove to the 
judge’s satisfaction in the hearing.  On the first issue, admission of the body 
and related evidence, the prosecution had two related goals.  They were to 
present credible evidence that, despite the constitutional violation, the body of 
Pamela Powers would have inevitably been found by lawful means and that the 
body would have been in a condition similar to that in which it was actually 
found.158  The defense team wanted to demonstrate just the opposite. 
The State first marked its exhibit consisting of photographs and maps of 
the location where the body was found and two photographs taken of the body 
at the time of the discovery.159  These exhibits were introduced to help 
demonstrate that if the police search had continued, the body would have been 
discovered.  The State’s witnesses testified that these photographs 
demonstrated the body was not hidden by snow before it was disturbed.160 
John Jutte, a special agent for the Iowa Bureau of Criminal Investigation, 
was the first witness called by the prosecution.161  Jutte testified that he was 
one of the people who had first found Pamela Powers’s body.162  Judge Denato 
sought and received a stipulation that the body was found through the actions 
of Detective Leaming and Williams.163  Jutte went on and described the bright 
clothes that first caught his attention upon locating the body.164  He also 
testified that the face was partially exposed and had not been covered by 
snow.165 
Carroll Dawson, who was in the Des Moines Police Department on the 
night that the body was located, was next called.166  He testified that he helped 
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to remove the body from the crime scene.167  He stated that Pamela was 
originally partially covered with snow which was brushed off after a picture 
was taken.168  He identified a picture presented by the prosecutor as accurately 
showing the body as he initially saw it.169  Upon cross-examination, Officer 
Dawson admitted that he did not know whether anyone other than himself may 
have cleared snow from the body prior to pictures being taken.170  Hoping to 
clarify the situation Judge Denato asked about the snow on the body.171  
Officer Dawson told him that he had to brush snow off to be able to completely 
see the body, but he did not remember anyone else doing so.172 
The State then called Dr. Jack Hatchitt, who in 1968 had been a Des 
Moines Police Department Medical Examiner and had helped to carry the body 
out of the culvert.173  Dr. Hatchitt testified that when found, the body was 
completely frozen.174  His testimony also revealed that at the time the body 
was found it was getting dark and snowing.175  The State then introduced two 
exhibits, which were climatological charts, which showed the temperatures for 
the Des Moines area for the months of December 1968 and January 1969.176 
Thomas Ruxlow of the Iowa Bureau of Criminal Investigation testified that 
he was in charge of the search operation, which began on December 26, 1968.  
He explained that a search party composed of around 200 individuals had been 
assembled.  He said that the search concentrated on Jasper and Poweshiek 
Counties because articles of clothing had been found at the Grinnell rest area 
on Interstate 80.  The search first started in Poweshiek County and moved 
westward into Jasper County.  Agent Ruxlow explained that the search was 
systematic.177  After getting maps of Poweshiek and Jasper Counties, they were 
marked off in grid fashion with an area roughly seven miles north and south of 
Interstate 80 being searched.178  The volunteers were split into teams of four to 
six people and assigned specific grids to be searched.  The instructions given to 
the volunteers when they began the search at 10:00 a.m. were: 
When searching, to check all the roads, the ditches, any culverts; they were 
instructed to get down and look into any culverts.  If they came upon any 
abandoned farm buildings, they were instructed to go onto the property and 
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search those abandoned farm buildings or any other places where a small child 
could be secreted.179 
Ruxlow told the court that all of the sections of Poweshiek and Jasper 
Counties had been searched by the time the body was found.  He explained that 
Polk County would have been searched in the same grid technique and 
estimated that the body would have been located in an additional three to five 
hours.180  Agent Ruxlow explained that the search was suspended at 3:00 p.m. 
when it was apparent that Williams was taking Detective Leaming to the 
body’s location.181  When pressed, he testified that he did not know when the 
search would have been resumed had the body not been found.182 
The next witness that the State called was Dr. Earl Rose, a physician who 
specialized in pathology.  Dr. Rose testified that freezing temperatures stopped 
decomposition of human bodies by stopping enzymatic actions. When 
questioned as to whether three to five hours of additional of freezing 
temperatures would affect the decomposition of a body he answered, “No.”  
He added that a body kept in continual freezing temperatures would be 
preserved for a postmortem autopsy until it thawed.183  He added that 
according to temperature charts for the time in question the body would not 
have thawed until April of 1969.184 
In response to a defense question, Dr. Rose testified that fluid samples 
which Dr. Luka had taken from the mouth, rectal, and vaginal areas of the 
body, that tested positive for acid phosphatases would also have been 
preserved due to the freezing temperatures.185  He noted that the positive acid 
phosphatase test was an indication that seminal fluid was present, even if there 
was no presence of spermatozoa.186  Dr. Rose also admitted that Dr. Luka’s 
original report on the condition of the body indicated that the face had been 
disturbed by some sort of animal and that it was not uncommon in rural areas 
for a body to be subject to such abuse by animals.187 
The defense introduced two items to demonstrate that the body would not 
have inevitably been found without a violation of Williams’s rights.  Both were 
attempts to show that it was getting dark and snowing which made discovery 
of the body less likely.  The first was a chart giving the time of sunrise and 
sunset for Des Moines, Iowa.188  The second was a transcript of the testimony 
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of Detective Leaming from the first trial relating to the weather conditions at 
the time when the body was found and the fact that it still took the police five 
minutes to discover the body, even when they had been led to its location.189 
Judge Denato moved on to consider the admissibility of hairs which had 
been gathered from Williams while he was in custody.  The State called 
Officer Carroll Dawson of the Des Moines Police Department.  He testified 
that on December 27, 1968, while Williams was being held at the Polk County 
Jail, he requested some hair samples from Williams, who willingly gave 
them.190  During cross-examination Officer Dawson admitted that he had 
known of Williams’s mental history, but had not informed him of his Miranda 
rights prior to requesting the hair samples.191 
The defense then called Williams.  Williams testified that he feared for 
himself when the officers asked him for hair samples and that it would be more 
accurate to say that the officers took hair samples from him.192  He went on to 
state that he allowed the hairs to be taken because he believed that they had 
gotten his attorney’s permission.  He said that he could not believe that after 
Detective Leaming had already broken one agreement with McKnight that the 
police would do anything else to him without consulting his attorney.193  
Williams admitted on cross-examination that when the hair samples were taken 
the police had not threatened him or promised him anything in return for the 
samples.194 
Judge Denato ruled on the suppression motions on June 1, 1977.195  Judge 
Denato disallowed use of Williams’s statements during the trip between 
Davenport and Des Moines, but allowed use of the body and all of the physical 
evidence associated with its discovery due to an inevitable discovery exception 
to the exclusionary rule.  Judge Denato stated that guidance for his decision 
was found in the footnote of Justice Stewart’s majority opinion in Brewer v. 
Williams.196  He also noted that the burden of proof that the prosecution had to 
meet was a preponderance of the evidence.197  Judge Denato’s ruling stated: 
The Court concludes that the searchers would have arrived at the site of the 
body within a short time of its actual finding, had they continued the search 
after dark.  The culvert in question was itself uncovered and readily visible and 
in getting down to look into it as the searchers were doing the depression on 
either side of it would have been obvious—the body was in one of these 
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depressions. Had the searchers stopped due to the snow and the dark the next 
day was a Friday and a weekend was upcoming—the search would clearly 
have been taken up again where it left off, given the extreme circumstances of 
this case and the body would have been found in short order. . . .  In any case 
the frozen body would have stayed frozen and deterioration suspended, into 
April according to Dr. Rose. . . .  Accordingly, the Court concludes that the 
body of Pamela Powers would have been found in any event even had the 
incriminating statements not been elicited from the defendant and that 
decomposition would not have taken place so as to alter the medical 
examination findings of Dr. Luka and thus there held admissible in 
evidence.198 
Judge Denato also allowed the samples of body hairs taken from Williams to 
be used because Williams had consented, because there had been no 
compulsion, and Williams had knowingly waived his constitutional rights.199  
Judge Denato then granted a defense request to have Williams tested at Mercy 
Hospital to determine if he had the ability to produce sperm. 
B. The Trial 
As the date for trial drew closer, both parties to the case continued to 
maneuver to advance strategies that would benefit their view of the case at 
trial.  Since the first trial, new rules governing discovery had been established 
by the Iowa Supreme Court.  The new rules gave the defense access to all 
police files and reports regardless of whether the prosecution would rely on 
them at trial.200  As trial grew closer, the defense began a search for alternative 
suspects because a police report, made available to them through the 
broadened discovery process, showed that the police once theorized that 
Williams was sterile.  The defense also gained access to a prosecution report 
which showed that, according to the autopsy report, there were no spermatozoa 
found in the semen taken from the body of Pamela Powers.201 
Since a sterility test showed that Williams was not sterile, the defense 
believed that someone other than Williams was responsible for the attack on 
Pamela.  The suspect that the defense had in mind was Albert Bowers, who, it 
claimed, had a history of child molestation.  Bowers, like Williams, was a 
black male who lived in the Y.M.C.A., and was employed there to clean 
washrooms at the time of Pamela’s disappearance.202 Defense lawyers 
contended that a towel covered with human blood had been found in Bowers’s 
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room the day after the crime.203  They also claimed that despite requests by 
police that he remain in town, Bowers left Des Moines shortly after Williams 
was arrested.204  The defense thought that some of the pubic hairs discovered 
in the investigation could have come from Bowers.  Bowers, however, had 
died in 1971.205  Due to these facts, the defense was granted an order to 
exhume the body.  After the body was exhumed on June 24, 1977, an autopsy 
was performed.206  Because the results were positive for spermatozoa the 
defense never made mention of Albert Bowers as a possible suspect during the 
trial process.207 
Prior to trial, the prosecutors informed the court that it could not produce 
any of the records of the medical tests that had been conducted on the fluids 
taken from Pamela Powers’s body.  The court was told that these tests, which 
had been stored at Wilden Hospital in Des Moines, were destroyed when the 
basement flooded.208  Due to this, the prosecutors motioned for a ruling that the 
defense could not make mention at trial that even though acid phosphatase was 
found on the body, there was no sign of sperm.  The prosecutors argued that 
since Dr. Luka, who had performed the autopsy, had not been present when the 
fluids were tested, he could not testify as to what particular tests were 
performed or the competency of the individual who conducted the tests.209  
Judge Denato denied this motion and allowed both sides to work off the record 
in regard to the test results.210 
On July 7, 1977, the State, represented by lead counsel Robert Blink and 
co-counsel Rodney Ryan, began to present its case, which would take two and 
a half days, the calling of eighteen witnesses, and the presentment of forty-one 
exhibits.211  Robert Blink’s opening statement provided a narrative of the 
events involved in the case which the jurors would learn about.212 
The defense’s opening statement began by telling the courtroom that 
Williams had indeed carried Pamela Powers out of the Y.M.C.A. on December 
24, 1968, and disposed of her in a rural area.213  The defense went on to 
explain Williams did not, however, kill the girl.  Instead, Williams had found 
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the body in his seventh floor room at the Y.M.C.A., panicked and removed it 
hoping not to be implicated in the crime.214  The defense said that Williams did 
this due to the facts and circumstances which existed in his life at the time, but 
did not explain that at the time of the crime Williams was an escapee from a 
mental hospital where he had been sent for statutory rape.215  The defense went 
on to explain its theory that the crime had been committed by a sterile man, 
which excluded Williams as a suspect since he was not sterile.216 
At trial the State’s first witnesses, which included Nelda Powers, Merlin 
Powers, Kevin Sanders and Donald Hanna, provided the same testimony that 
they had at Williams’s first trial.  They described Pamela’s disappearance 
followed by Williams’s flight.217  The defense did not cross-examine any of 
these witnesses.218 
The State also brought forward a group of witnesses to demonstrate 
Williams’s efforts to dispose of evidence of the crime.  Merle Killinger 
testified that on December 25, 1968, he found a number of items in the men’s 
restroom at the rest stop near Grinnell, Iowa.219  These items, which included a 
blanket, a man’s suit jacket, a man’s suit trousers, a man’s yellow shirt, a 
man’s light jacket, a man’s handkerchief, a girl’s sweater type blouse, a 
Y.M.C.A. towel, a pair of girl’s socks, and a pair of girl’s slacks, were 
presented as Exhibits 1 through 10 for the prosecution.220  The last two items 
were positively identified as belonging to Pamela Powers.  Mr. Killinger then 
revealed that he had taken all of the items, bagged them together, and given 
them to Officer Gates of the Grinnell Police Department.221 
Andrew Newquist, who worked as a special agent for the Iowa Highway 
Department in 1968, testified that he had been present when Williams’s car 
was searched.222  He identified the State’s Exhibits 19 and 20 as photos of 
Williams’s car.223  Officer Newquist then testified about State Exhibits 13 
through 17 as items which had been gathered when the car was searched.  
These items included a necktie, a pair of slacks, a rear seat floor mat, rear seat 
covers, and a rug from the front seat area.224  Officer Newquist identified all of 
the items except for the necktie and pair of socks, neither of which carried his 
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identification mark.225  Officer Newquist explained that these items were 
turned over to Chief Wendell Nichols of the Des Moines Police Department on 
December 27, 1968.226 
The State then called Thomas Ruxlow of the Iowa Bureau of Criminal 
Investigation.  Agent Ruxlow testified that on December 26, 1968, he had 
observed the body of Pamela Powers where it was found.227  Agent Ruxlow 
was then taken through a series of aerial photographs which were marked State 
Exhibits 27 through 41.  He testified that the photos clearly depicted the roads 
which connected the Y.M.C.A. to the location where the body was 
discovered.228  The next two witnesses were called to demonstrate a clear chain 
of custody for some of the exhibits which were used as evidence.229  To help 
demonstrate Williams’s eastern flight, the State next called Mark Cupples.  
Cupples testified that on Christmas Eve 1968, Williams stopped at the gas 
station he worked at and bought two dollars worth of gas.230 
The State called Cornelius McWright, who was an FBI laboratory 
technician from Washington, D.C.  McWright told the court that the FBI 
received a package of evidence from the Des Moines Police Department, 
which they tested for the presence of semen.231  After explaining how such 
tests were done, he gave the results.  McWright stated that both the man’s shirt 
and pants, which had been found at the Interstate 80 rest stop, revealed signs of 
semen, but no sperm.232  McWright also testified that he had tested several 
items for blood typing.  These included the man’s shirt and a towel found at 
the rest stop on Interstate 80, which both proved to contain type O blood, the 
same type as Pamela Powers.233  A child’s undershirt also found at the rest stop 
had blood stains, but the type could not be determined.234 
During cross-examination, McWright testified that he had tested a sock 
and tie, which had been found inside of the glove box of Williams’s car.  The 
test indicated the presence of traces of sperm.235  McWright was then asked if 
the presence of sperm on some of the articles tested, but only semen on others 
would indicate that the samples came from different persons.  When pressed, 
McWright admitted that one conclusion that could be drawn from the lack of 
sperm in some semen stains, but not in others, was the possibility that the two 
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semen samples came from different sources.236  McWright informed the court 
that the bedspread taken from Williams’s room had blood, but not semen or 
any other type of biological stains.237 
Dr. Leo Luka, who was the Polk County Medical Examiner that performed 
the autopsy on the body of Pamela Powers, testified next.  Dr. Luka testified 
that the external examination of the body showed numerous abrasions and 
lacerations on the head, face, and legs.238  The face was cyanotic and it looked 
like part of the nose had been chewed off by a small animal.  The probable 
cause of death given by Dr. Luka was asphyxiation, most likely from being 
smothered.239  He also testified that there were signs of sexual abuse at or 
shortly after the time of death due to disturbances of the rectum, mouth, and 
vagina, but there had been no penetration.240  The rectum was dilated and the 
vagina was separated in an unnatural position, but the hymen was intact.241  Dr. 
Luka went on to explain that fluid taken from the rectum, vagina, and the 
mouth had tested positive for acid phosphatase indicating the presence of 
semen, but that no traces of sperm were found.242 
On cross-examination, Dr. Luka said he believed that the sexual 
molestation had taken place after death.243  He said that there was no sign of 
bleeding in either the rectum or vagina.244  He was then asked about the effect 
that freezing would have on any sperm which may have been present in the 
fluids found on the body.  He answered that the lack of sperm could be 
explained by the freezing temperatures, which would destroy any sperm that 
was present.245  The defense reminded him of a deposition he had given on 
June 7, 1977, when he said that under the freezing conditions the body was 
subjected to, one would expect to see sperm in seminal fluid.246  Despite this 
reminder, Dr. Luka stuck to his statement that freezing could cause the 
breakdown of spermatozoa in seminal fluid.247 
The final witness was Morris Clark, a special agent of the FBI who in 1969 
was the chief of the Microscopic Analysis Unit.248  Agent Clark established his 
credentials as an expert in identifying hair samples.  Agent Clark testified that 
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several pieces of evidence contained hairs that were similar to samples of hair 
from both Williams and Pamela Powers.249  On the various pieces of evidence 
found at the rest stop on Interstate 80 the tests revealed that there were both 
negroid head and pubic hairs, which were all microscopically similar to the 
sample hairs provided by Williams.250  Some of the evidence also contained 
head hairs similar to those of Pamela.251  Also found attached to the evidence 
were “negroid body hairs,” which were not similar to Williams’s; a few white 
hairs, the race of which could not be determined; and two pubic hairs, the race 
of which could not be determined.252  Agent Clark then went on to discuss his 
findings on the evidence gathered from the search of Williams’s car.  The rear 
floor mat contained a few hairs that matched Pamela Powers; it also contained 
a “negroid head hair” which was not like Williams’s and a few caucasian pubic 
hairs that did not match any samples.253  The rear seat cover and the left front 
floor mat only contained hairs that could be matched with the defendant and 
victim.254  The final hairs, which were examined by Agent Clark, had been 
taken from the body of Pamela Powers.  He said that of the two hairs that were 
found, one head and one pubic, both were similar to those of Williams.255 
On cross-examination, Agent Clark was pushed to admit that even though 
some of the hairs were similar to Williams’s it was only a probability that they 
had actually come from him.256  When questioned about the bedspread which 
had been taken from Williams’s room at the Y.M.C.A., he testified that he 
found two “negroid pubic hairs,” which were not comparable to Williams’s.257  
The next information elicited in cross-examination was an indication of the 
relative ease by which hairs fall off the human body and are transferred from 
one article to another.  Agent Clark then admitted that if all of the items found 
at the rest stop on Interstate 80 were mingled together in one bag, hairs “very 
well could be” be transferred from one item to another.258  Agent Clark also 
admitted that this was true for all of the items found in Williams’s car.259  A 
final defense line of cross-examination concerned the unidentified hairs that 
were found.  Agent Clark told the court there were ten hairs that remained 
unidentified.260  When asked he stated that he had not examined any of the 
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unidentified hairs to determine if they had come from a common source.261  In 
a brief redirect examination, Robert Blink elicited a response that it was not 
unusual to have hairs from a crime scene that remained unidentified.262 
The primary defense strategy during the trial was to deny any greater role 
in the crime than the admission of Williams’s disposal of the body of Pamela 
Powers.  The defense claimed that someone, who was not named at trial, had 
killed Pamela Powers and placed her body in Williams’s room in the Y.M.C.A.  
The defense argued that upon discovery of the body Williams panicked, 
carried the body out of the Y.M.C.A., disposed of it by the road side, finally 
realized the gravity of his actions two days later and gave himself up.  In 
presenting its view of the case, the defense called four witnesses. 
To support the defense’s theory, it used part of the prosecution’s theory of 
how the crime happened to its advantage.  This was because the prosecution 
claimed that Pamela had been murdered while she was being sexually 
molested.  To prove this the prosecution had tests conducted to determine if 
spermatozoa could be found on Pamela’s body or on her clothing.  These tests 
revealed that while acid phosphatases, a component of semen, were found in 
the body and the clothes, there were no traces of spermatozoa found.  The 
defense used this information to put forward the theory that whoever had 
attacked Pamela was sterile, which removed Williams from suspicion since he 
was not sterile. 
The key to the defense’s case then became its claim that a sterile man 
committed the crime. To win the case the defense view that freezing preserved, 
rather than destroyed sperm cells, would have to be accepted by the jury.  One 
problem that the defense faced at the beginning of its case was Dr. Luka’s 
testimony that the freezing temperatures the body was subject to would have 
destroyed any sperm which had been present in the body.  This testimony 
contradicted the prosecution’s own position at the suppression hearing when it 
argued in favor of applying the inevitable discovery exception.  At that time 
the prosecution argued that the condition of the body was unaffected by the 
weather because it was preserved due to the freezing temperatures. The 
defense also believed that Dr. Luka had changed his earlier testimony that 
freezing would not affect the composition of spermatozoa once he found out 
that Williams was not sterile.  As a result, at the start of its own case in an 
attempt to impeach the testimony of Dr. Luka the defense called Officer Don 
Knox of the Des Moines Police Department. 
The testimony of Officer Knox was heard without the jury being present in 
order to give Judge Denato a chance to rule on its admissibility without the 
possibility of tainting the jury’s deliberating process.  Officer Knox testified 
that in either December 1968 or January 1969, Dr. Luka informed him of the 
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autopsy results which were negative for sperm.263  When asked, Knox told the 
court that the sterility theory of crime had been his and not Dr. Luka’s.264  He 
then examined two defense exhibits which were police memos indicating that 
the police were trying to determine if Williams ever had a vasectomy.265  In 
reply to a question, he then admitted that the police probably would not have 
followed up on their sterility theory if Dr. Luka had told them that freezing 
destroyed signs of sperm.266 
The prosecution objected to Officer Knox’s testimony on the grounds of 
relevancy and Officer Knox’s lack of qualification as an expert witness in the 
field of male reproductive systems or cell decomposition.267  The defense 
replied that they were not suggesting that Officer Knox was an expert in the 
field, but that he could shed light on the veracity of Dr. Luka’s testimony that 
freezing destroyed sperm.268  Judge Denato ruled that Officer Knox’s 
testimony could not be put before the jury.269  He said that the defense had 
interpreted Dr. Luka’s testimony too narrowly because Luka had stated that 
freezing was only one possibility to explain the absence of spermatozoa.270  
Furthermore, Officer Knox demonstrated that the sterility theory had not 
originated with Dr. Luka.271 
With the jury seated, the defense called its first witness Dr. Earl Rose, a 
pathologist, as an expert witness.  Dr. Rose had testified at the suppression 
hearing that freezing under the conditions in which the body was found would 
not have an effect on any sperm that may have been present.272  Dr. Rose 
testified that based on temperatures when the body was being sought, the cold 
would have stopped any decomposition of sperm cells.273  He explained that 
the time in between the abduction and the discarding of the body would not 
have been enough to destroy any sperm cells which may have been present.274  
Dr. Rose also testified that it would not be uncommon considering the 
conditions under which Pamela Powers had died for the body to empty the 
contents of its bladder.275  Dr. Rose next testified that in 1968 it was possible to 
do a blood test on semen stains, thus allowing you to know the blood type of 
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the individual from whom the semen came.276  The last piece of information 
elicited from Dr. Rose was an admission that he had previously testified in this 
case as a witness for the State and that his current testimony was unchanged 
from his original.277  Upon cross-examination Dr. Rose informed the court that 
he had no personal knowledge of the autopsy of Pamela Powers.278 
The defense’s second witness was Dr. Dennis Boatman, a urologist who 
specialized in the male reproductive system.  Dr. Boatman was asked about 
Defense Exhibit H, a report on a semen analysis done on Williams.279  He 
explained that it showed that Williams was not sterile and was within the 
normal range of sperm production with a sperm count of 26 million per cc.280  
Dr. Boatman was then asked to comment on various explanations that might 
allow an individual who was sterile at one time to later have a normal sperm 
count.281  He answered that one would be if they had a vasectomy reversed, but 
an examination of Williams revealed that this procedure had not been 
performed.282  He explained that seminal fluid only contained two percent 
sperm.283  That was true, he told the court, whether it was a man’s first 
ejaculation in one day or his tenth.284  Regardless of the number of 
ejaculations, one would expect to find two percent sperm in the seminal fluid, 
although there would be less seminal fluid with each new ejaculation.  You 
would, however, expect to find the sperm count still in the millions he 
added.285 
The defense next called Clarence Yeager, who had been a Davenport 
police officer in 1968.  He informed the court that he was responsible for 
keeping Williams’s car under observation after it was discovered in 
Davenport.286  He testified that the car stayed outside in the cold until 5:30 
p.m. on December 25, 1968, when the car was seized and the warrant 
served.287  It was at that time that the necktie and sock were found in the car.288  
When Clarence Yeager was done testifying the defense requested that a 
climatological chart for Davenport showing the high temperature on December 
25, 1968 as fifteen degrees Fahrenheit and a low of three degrees be stipulated 
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to and offered as evidence.289  The request was granted.  The defense then 
moved to offer its other exhibits into evidence.  These included a number of 
things from Williams’s room including a bedspread, a pillowcase, and a set of 
sheets.290  There was no objection from the prosecution.291  The defense then 
received a stipulation that if Jack Sullivan, the chief security officer for 
Northwestern Bell Telephone of Des Moines, was called he would testify that 
phone records indicated that on December 24, 1968, a Reverend Robert 
Anthony at the Des Moines Y.M.C.A. received a call from Mount Pleasant, 
Iowa at 12:28 p.m. and that the call lasted until 12:40 p.m.292 
The final defense witness was Dr. Garry Peterson, a forensic pathologist. 
Dr. Peterson stated that in his position in the Medical Examiner’s Office of 
Hennepin County, Minnesota, he reviewed approximately 1,500 sexual assault 
cases a year and that he normally testified for law enforcement in such 
cases.293  He also told the court that he had experience with detecting sperm in 
the bodies of women that had been frozen.  He testified that after normal 
intercourse sperm was detectable for between twelve to twenty-four hours.294  
If a person died after intercourse, the sperm would be detectable for a longer 
period of time.295 The reason was that the secretions of the female reproductive 
system would cease and the body temperature would lower stopping enzymes 
from causing decomposition of the sperm.296  He added, the freezing of a body 
at the time of or shortly after death would preserve any sperm indefinitely until 
the body was thawed.  Dr. Peterson was then asked if a girl died under the 
same conditions as Pamela Powers and her body was frozen within the same 
time span as hers, whether he believed any sperm present would have been 
preserved.  He answered that he believed it would.297  After being questioned, 
Dr. Peterson told the court that he had reviewed Dr. Luka’s autopsy report and 
that he believed that because the hymen was intact even though the lips of the 
vulva area had been spread and the lack of any internal or external trauma to 
the vaginal area, showed that there had been no attempt to insert a penis into 
the vagina.298 
The prosecution called one rebuttal witness to try to strengthen its 
argument that freezing would destroy rather than preserve any sperm cells 
which may have been present on Pamela Powers’s body.  The witness was Dr. 
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David Culp, a urologist.  Dr. Culp was a specialist in the reproductive system 
and had done research involving freezing sperm cells for later insemination.  In 
the most technical testimony of the trial Dr. Culp tried to explain the difference 
between slow freezing, such as would have happened to Pamela Powers’s 
body, and quick freezing, which takes place at much colder temperatures, and 
their effects on sperm.  He told the court that slow freezing tends to kill live 
sperm cells and may cause them to be destroyed.299  He also testified that 
certain diseases such as chicken pox, mononucleosis, and herpes could cause a 
man to be temporarily sterile for a period of time.  Drug usage could also have 
the same effect.  He pointed out that continual ejaculations could deplete a man 
of enough sperm to make them almost undetectable.300  Dr. Culp could not 
provide an answer when asked if one would expect to find signs of sperm 
under the conditions in which Pamela Powers met her death and her body was 
then discovered.301  Instead, he said there were too many unknown variables to 
be able to give a definitive answer.302  Upon cross-examination Dr. Culp 
admitted that he had never performed an autopsy in a sexual assault case and 
that he had never had the opportunity to observe sperm that was found inside a 
dead woman’s body.303 
In the closing arguments both sides presented a dramatic appeal as they 
conveyed their theories of the crime.  Robert Blink, the prosecutor, placed all 
blame for the murder of Pamela Powers on Robert Williams.304 After 
explaining the law of first degree murder to the jury, he next told them that it 
was their duty to determine the facts of the case.305  He then walked them 
through what he considered to be the facts of the case.  He reviewed the 
testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits which were introduced Williams’s 
flight, dumping of evidence and surrender.306 
Blink then summarized the case against Williams.  After telling the jury 
that Williams had killed Pamela Powers during an attempted rape, Blink 
continued: 
The problem then becomes to get rid of the evidence.  Now, why, why, if Mr. 
Williams did not in fact kill her, did he go to such an extensive means to as 
much as possible ensure that he would not be connected with the crime?  He 
went to those extensive means because he knew that he had to get rid of the 
evidence.  It pointed at him.  And rightfully so, for it is absolutely consistent 
with the acts of a man who committed murder and it is no way inconsistent 
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with the acts of a man who did not commit murder.  Now, we don’t have an 
eye witness, Pamela Powers is dead.  But I think Pamela Powers speaks to us 
in a certain respect.  She tells us about what happened.  She tells us through the 
clothing, through the bloodstained towel, the post-mortem examination.  And I 
submit to you that the muffled cries of Pamela Powers in Room 724 of the 
YMCA in Des Moines, Iowa on Christmas Eve of 1968, which were but a 
whimper and whisper at that time are reverberating in these halls.  And they 
speak to you, and they speak to all of us.  And they say that “I was killed, my 
life was taken into the adult world, something I didn’t even understand—I 
couldn’t comprehend, only to leave it in a violent fashion.”  Who took out the 
body?  He did.  Who dumped the body?  He did.  Who disposed of the 
clothing?  He did.  Who ran away?  He did.  Who killed the girl?  He did.307 
In its closing argument the defense again admitted that Williams had 
disposed of the body of Pamela Powers, but denied any involvement in the 
murder.  Gerald Crawford told the jury that in order to find Mr. Williams 
guilty of first degree murder the jury had to answer “yes” to one of two 
questions.308  The first question was whether “Anthony Williams wilfully 
killed Pamela Powers, with malice aforethought, with deliberation, with 
premeditation and with the specific intent to kill.”309  He believed that after 
hearing all the evidence the State had failed to demonstrate this.  Therefore, a 
guilty verdict was dependant on a second question. That being whether 
Anthony Williams killed Pamela Powers in attempting or perpetrating a sexual 
assault.  Gerald Crawford then told the jury, “The evidence is clear.  Pamela 
Powers, at the time of her death or shortly thereafter, was sexually assaulted by 
a sterile male.”310  He added that the killing and molestation happened before 
Pamela’s body was ever removed from the Y.M.C.A.311  He noted that all of 
the facts of the prosecution’s case were consistent with this conclusion.312 
Crawford raised questions about whether Williams had enough time to 
commit the murder.  He told the jury: 
The evidence also shows that from 12:28 until 12:40 Mr. Williams was on the 
telephone and you have that evidence before you.  They have seen him leaving 
at 1 o’clock.  He was on the telephone until 12:40 and ask yourself, in 20 
minutes does a man go from the 7th floor of the YMCA downstairs, spot a 
little girl and abduct her, go back upstairs with her to Room 724, suffocate her 
and sexually assault her three times, put a bundle together around her, put 
 
 307. Id. at 345–46. 
 308. Id. at 348. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. at 349. 
 311. Trial Transcript, supra note 9, at 349. 
 312. Id. at 374. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] NIX v. WILLIAMS AND THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY EXCEPTION 429 
some clothes on top of the bundle and carry the bundle downstairs to the main 
floor and out the lobby in 20 minutes?313 
Crawford then attacked the prosecution’s case calling everything beyond 
what the defense itself stipulated as a fact to be circumstantial.314  He went on 
to explain the weaknesses in the prosecution’s case. He first pointed out the 
difficulties in believing the prosecution’s position that the freezing of the body 
would have destroyed any signs of sperm cells that may have been present in 
the seminal fluid taken off the body.  In doing so, he noted out that Williams’s 
car was also subject to freezing temperatures before it was seized and searched.  
He went on to say that the socks and necktie which were found in the car were 
not tested by the FBI for signs of sperm until almost an additional month had 
gone by.315  He found it curious that despite the freezing temperatures and 
delay in time, those sperm cells had not been destroyed.316  He also found it 
odd, in light of the testimony that no urine stain had been found on Williams’s 
sheets if the crime had taken place in his room as the prosecution contended.317  
He told the jury to consider if a struggle had taken place in Williams’s room, 
why was there not at least a partial fingerprint of Pamela Powers’s to be 
found.318  All indications were that she had been attacked somewhere else and 
placed in Williams’s room after she was dead.319  He next attacked the 
prosecution’s hair evidence reminding the jury that all of the items found at the 
rest stop had been placed in a common bag and that some of Williams’s hairs 
may have easily been transferred from his articles to hers.320  He said what he 
found informative was that a total of twelve hairs were of unknown origin 
including two pubic hairs that were found on the little girl’s slacks. He also 
expressed disappointment that the prosecution had not thought to compare 
these unidentified hairs to see if they could have come from the same 
person.321 
Gerald Crawford explained that he believed that the crime was committed 
by a sterile man and that they had presented adequate evidence to show that 
Williams was not sterile.322  The jurors were told they would have to sort 
through the testimony given by all of the doctors as to the effects that freezing 
would have upon the decomposition of sperm cells.  To help them with this 
process, he went over the inconsistencies in Dr. Luka’s testimony reading from 
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the depositions in which he had gone on record to say that freezing would 
preserve sperm cells and comparing that to his comments at trial that it would 
destroy them.323  He told the jurors to use their own common sense as to what 
effect freezing has in the preservation of something.324  He reminded the jurors 
that the State’s other witness on the matter, Dr. Culp, worked with living 
sperm in the area of artificial insemination and had never examined a dead 
female for traces of sperm.325  Next, he drew the jurors’s attention to Dr. Rose 
who had testified that freezing would preserve any sperm present. He pointed 
out that Dr. Rose had entered the case as a witness for the prosecution, but was 
uncalled by the State when it was realized that Williams was not sterile and his 
testimony was no longer helpful.326  He also reminded the jurors that Dr. Rose 
had told the court that you could distinguish a person’s blood type from a 
sample of seminal fluid.  He stated that if such a test had been done it could 
have conclusively shown that the seminal fluid had not come from Williams, 
but the State had failed to conduct such a test.327  Finally, he reminded the 
jurors that Dr. Peterson, who was a specialist in sexual assaults, also testified 
that freezing would preserve, not destroy, any sperm which had been 
present.328  Due to all of the problems which existed in the State’s case, Gerald 
Crawford suggested that there was enough doubt for Williams to be found not 
guilty.329 
Roger Owens then took over the defense’s closing argument. He explained 
to the jurors that other than the defense’s own admission that Williams had 
disposed of the body, the prosecution’s case was based upon circumstantial 
evidence.330  He said that in a circumstantial case such as this, all of the 
evidence must be consistent in order for the jury to convict. It was not 
consistent in this case because Williams was not sterile.331  He told the jurors 
that they had taken an oath to uphold the law.  Then he threw a law book 
twenty feet across the courtroom.332  He then said that the book was worthless 
when the laws were not upheld.333  He ended the closing arguments stating 
“And by God, now, everyone at this table wants you to uphold that law.  Not 
just [defense counsel] Mr. Crawford, Mr. Wellman and Mr. Williams, but 
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[prosecutors] Mr. Blink and Mr. Ryan also, and so do I. . . . I think you will 
find Mr. Williams not guilty.”334 
The prosecution was then given the last word in the trial.  Robert Blink 
said the defense theory that Williams could not have committed the crime 
since he was not sterile was much ado about nothing.  He said that all of the 
expert witnesses were dealing in theories and that their conclusions were 
influenced by a wide variety of variables.335  The variable that could not be 
explained away was that the semen on the body and the pants found at the rest 
stop on Interstate 80 were similar.336  For dramatic effect Blink then wrote the 
word “body” on the courtroom chalk board followed by the word “pants.”  He 
then emphasized the point by holding up a pair of pants with the name 
“Anthony” on them and saying what was on the girl was on these pants.337  
Blink told the jury that the link between the pants and the semen could not be 
denied and that this perhaps more than any other piece of evidence haunted 
Williams.338 
He warned the jury about falling into the situation which the defense 
desired.  That being, speculating about what may have happened rather than 
concentrating on what the evidence actually showed.  Blink explained, “I think 
they want you to speculate.  I think they want you to guess.  I think they want 
you to imagine.”339  An example, he believed, was the defenses attempt to 
make a big deal out of the lack of a urine stain on the sheets from Williams’s 
room.  Blink told the jurors that rather than speculating on why, they should 
remember that Pamela had originally shown up missing when she left to go to 
the wash room which provides its own explanation.340  Robert Blink ended his 
summation by asking for the jury to bring in a verdict of guilty and added, “It 
is your common sense that must lead to your conclusions.”341 
After receiving its instructions, the jury retired for its deliberations at 9:17 
a.m. on July 13, 1977.342  Jury deliberations went much slower than in the first 
trial where the jury both ate lunch and convicted Williams in only 100 
minutes.343  Deliberations continued for seven hours until the jury quit for the 
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day.344  On July 14, 1977, the second day of jury deliberations, the jury 
requested the testimony of two witnesses, Dr. Luka and Dr. Peterson, to be 
read back to them.345  The attorneys were informed of the request.  In a 
meeting in Judge Denato’s chambers, Robert Blink objected to allowing the 
testimony to be read.  He argued that it unduly emphasized particular evidence 
and might possibly cause the jury to ignore the body of other evidence in the 
case which would not be in the best interest of the State.346  The defense 
counsel indicated that they had discussed the request with Williams and that 
they had no objections.347  Judge Denato decided to allow the request.348 
It is interesting that the indication from the jury deliberations was that the 
verdict in the case may have hinged upon whether freezing temperatures would 
have impacted the condition of the evidence.  This is ironic, because in the 
suppression hearing involving the inevitable discovery of the body, both 
parties to the case had made arguments in favor of the opposite conclusions 
they sought at trial.  At that hearing, the State which sought admission of the 
body and related evidence argued that even if it would have been found at a 
later point in time it would have been in the same condition due to the freezing 
temperatures.349  The defense, on the other hand, had argued that the body 
would not have been in the same condition if discovered later, and therefore, 
should not be allowed as evidence.  The argument which the State had made at 
the suppression hearing, but which it repudiated at trial, had been central to 
Judge Denato’s ruling that the body would have been inevitably discovered in 
the same condition. 
On July 15, 1977, at 10:02 a.m. the jury, after deliberating for thirteen and 
one-half hours, returned a verdict of guilty of first degree murder against 
Robert Williams.350  The jurors had taken six or seven ballots by late in the 
afternoon of July 14 and believed at that point that they were close to an 
agreement and considered coming back at 7:00 p.m. to try to reach a decision.  
Instead, they decided to take the night off in order to think over their positions.  
When they returned on the morning of July 15 they were able to reach a 
consensus.351  The jurors who spoke said that there was no animosity between 
the jurors over the verdict and one said that they were “glad it’s over” since 
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they “just want to forget about it.”352  The jurors did not explain what facts 
were most influential in reaching their verdict. 
C. The Second Appeals Process 
After his conviction Williams first pursued an appeal before the Iowa 
Supreme Court.  In State v. Williams,353 Williams’s attorneys argued that there 
were a variety of reasons why the conviction should be overturned, but the one 
with the most traction was that there was no inevitable discovery exception to 
the exclusionary rule.  The court unanimously ruled that the inevitable 
discovery exception was a constitutionally sound exception to the exclusionary 
rule.  It explained that under the exception: 
After the defendant has shown unlawful conduct on the part of the police, the 
State has the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the 
police did not act in bad faith for the purpose of hastening discovery of the 
evidence in question, and (2) that the evidence in question would have been 
discovered by lawful means.354 
After accepting the inevitable discovery exception, the court applied its 
rule to the particular facts of the case and found that the conditions imposed on 
the State to have been met.355  In its reasoning to support inevitable discovery 
the court relied on the prosecution’s arguments from the suppression hearing 
that, due to the freezing temperatures, the body would have remained 
preserved, despite the fact that the State had argued the opposite at trial. 
Williams next pursued habeas relief in Williams v. Nix.356  The habeas 
corpus proceeding was presided over by Judge Vietor.  Judge Vietor reviewed 
the evidence by studying the record and held an evidentiary hearing on August 
2, 1981, where most of the arguments and evidence presented were repetitious 
of those made before the Iowa Supreme Court.  There were, however, several 
new pieces of evidence which were considered by Judge Vietor.357  Despite the 
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new evidence and all the arguments made in the briefs and at oral argument, 
Judge Vietor’s resolution of the issues closely followed the same line of 
argument as that of the Iowa Supreme Court.  As a result, he ruled that there 
were no errors made by the trial court.358 
On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, Williams was more successful.359  The 
Eighth Circuit decided that it was not necessary to determine whether the 
inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule could withstand 
constitutional scrutiny.  Instead, it assumed arguendo that the exception did 
exist and that the Iowa Supreme Court had correctly established the rules for 
its application.360  Based upon all the available information, the Eighth Circuit 
then ruled that the police had not acted in good faith when they violated 
Williams’s right to counsel so the inevitable discovery exception as formulated 
by the Iowa Supreme Court could not be applied to Williams’s case.361  As a 
result, Pamela Powers’s body and all the evidence gained at the scene should 
not have been admitted at trial. 
Iowa sought review in the Supreme Court.  According to the Court it: 
granted certiorari to consider whether, at respondent Williams’s second murder 
trial in state court, evidence pertaining to the discovery and condition of the 
victim’s body was properly admitted on the ground that it would ultimately or 
inevitably have been discovered even if no violation of any constitutional or 
statutory provision had taken place.362 
Iowa’s brief drew distinctions between the different types of factual 
scenarios in which the inevitable discovery exception could be applied.363  The 
first of these scenarios was referred to as “independent inevitable 
discovery.”364  Iowa argued the Williams case represented an example of 
“independent inevitable discovery.”  In this scenario, which Iowa argued as the 
strongest case for use of the inevitable discovery exception, law enforcement 
officials are aggressively pursuing lawful means of discovering the evidence 
while simultaneously finding it through illegal conduct.  In effect, both 
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methods would have been successful so the police should not be penalized for 
the illegal method when the legal method would have accomplished the same 
thing at a later point in time.365  In these cases, the inevitable discovery 
exception really represented a variation of the well-accepted independent 
source rule.366 
Iowa argued that while application of the inevitable discovery exception 
had been controversial in the courts of appeals, it was due to it being applied in 
different factual situations. Iowa referred to one of these situations as 
“hypothetical independent source.”367  In cases of this type, courts must engage 
in far reaching speculation as to whether the questioned evidence would have 
been found through alternative legal methods.  This was because at the time 
the evidence was discovered no alternative legal method of discovering the 
evidence was being pursued.  As a result, a court would be forced to guess as 
to how law enforcement officials would have behaved if the evidence was not 
found illegally.  Often, as in cases involving standard operating procedures, 
such as checking a driver’s license, the guess would not be too speculative, but 
other situations would result in much more speculation.368 
An even more controversial application of the inevitable discovery 
exception resulted in cases labeled “dependent inevitable discovery.”369  In 
such cases, there is no actual or hypothetical lawful means of discovery being 
pursued at the time of the legal violation. In these cases, application of the 
inevitable discovery exception is an effort to salvage unlawful conduct as an 
afterthought. An example provided in the brief was allowing evidence gathered 
through a warrantless search because the government had the probable cause 
necessary to obtain a warrant, but it never attempted to do so.370  Iowa warned 
that if the exclusionary rule was ignored in such cases, the need to get warrants 
prior to searches would be virtually erased and the State did not support 
application of the inevitable discovery exception under these circumstances.371 
Because the facts of this particular case provided an example of 
“independent inevitable discovery,” Iowa argued that the Court should 
overrule the Eighth Circuit.  Iowa also argued that the exception should not 
include a good faith requirement.372  Even if the Court were to accept the 
inevitable discovery exception with a good faith requirement, Iowa believed 
that Detective Leaming’s actions did not violate this principle.  Iowa stated that 
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the record supported its position that Detective Leaming had not acted in bad 
faith in trying to elicit information from Williams.373 
In an amicus brief filed by the United States, the Solicitor General’s office 
presented a different view of the appropriate parameters of the inevitable 
discovery exception.  The United States argued that the inevitable discovery 
exception should be adopted by the Court as a logical extension of both the 
independent source and attenuation exceptions to the exclusionary rule.374  
Despite its stated desire to limit judicial speculation regarding whether 
evidence would be admissible, the U.S. position would allow considerably 
more latitude for evidence to be admitted under the exception than Iowa’s.  
The reason was that Iowa argued only for admission of evidence when the 
factual record could demonstrate that police already had in place a line of 
lawful investigation that would have led to discovery of the questioned 
evidence. The U.S. position, on the other hand, would allow admission of 
evidence under that circumstance, and when predictable investigative practices 
would have led to discovery even when the police had not initiated it at the 
time of the violation.375  This position would also allow admission when a 
private individual provided the information necessary to lead police to the 
evidence.376  The United States also argued that just as there was no linkage 
been good faith and admission of evidence in the independent source or 
attenuation exceptions there should not be one in the inevitable discovery 
exception.377 
As a result of the briefs submitted by Iowa and the United States, the 
Supreme Court had been made aware that there were a variety of approaches to 
inevitable discovery which, if desired, it could endorse.  The majority opinion 
in Nix v. Williams was written by Chief Justice Warren Burger and joined by 
Justices Byron White, Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, William Rehnquist, and 
Sandra Day O’Connor.  It started with a review of the facts of the case and its 
history.378  Before examining the constitutional soundness of the inevitable 
discovery exception, Chief Justice Burger noted that “the ‘vast majority’ of all 
courts, both state and federal” recognized the exception.379  Chief Justice 
Burger then discussed the heart of the case, the role of the exclusionary rule in 
the American legal system.380  The Court’s review of the history of the 
exclusionary rule found that its only function was to deter future police 
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violations of constitutionally protected rights.  While this interpretation of the 
reasons behind the exclusionary rule demonstrates a selective reading of its 
entire history, it was consistent with how the Burger Court had interpreted the 
rule.  Thus, in its reading of Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States381 the 
lesson to be learned was not that derivative evidence would also be excluded 
from trial when its discovery was the result of illegal behavior. Instead, the 
point which the Court emphasized from Silverthorne was that such information 
did not become “sacred and inaccessible” due to the independent source 
exception.382  Wong Sun v. United States383 provided a similar lesson about the 
attenuation exception which explained that illegally seized evidence did not 
have to be suppressed if it “has [also] been come at by . . . means sufficiently 
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.”384 
The central point in the majority opinion’s reading of the history of the 
exclusionary rule was that our judicial system has accepted the exclusionary 
rule due to its deterrent effect despite its high social cost of, at times, letting the 
guilty go free.385  Despite these costs, exclusion is necessary because the 
“prosecution is not to be put in a better position than it would have been in if 
no illegality had transpired.”386  An examination of the way that derivative 
evidence had been treated by the Court revealed, however, “that the 
prosecution is not put in a worse position simply because of some earlier police 
error or misconduct.387  As a result, even though there was a difference 
between the independent source and inevitable discovery exceptions to the 
exclusionary rule the Court believed there was “a functional similarity between 
these two doctrines in that exclusion of evidence that would inevitably have 
been discovered would also put the government in a worse position, because 
the police would have obtained that evidence if no misconduct had taken 
place.”388  After an examination of the history of the exclusionary rule, the 
Court found the inevitable discovery exception to be compatible with the 
Constitution.389 
Having accepted the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary 
rule into our body of law, the Court set some standards for its application.  In 
doing so, the Court stated that tainted evidence would be admissible if the 
prosecution could prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
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information would have been found inevitably by lawful means.390  When such 
a situation exists, “then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the 
evidence should be received.”391  The Court also held that in meeting its 
burden the prosecution did not have to show that the police acted in good 
faith.392  This was because such a showing would place courts in the position 
of withholding truthful evidence from juries which would place the “police in a 
worse position than they would have been if no unlawful conduct had 
transpired.”393  This, the Court believed, would have placed too high of a 
societal cost on our system of justice and its search for truth.  Furthermore, the 
Court believed that a showing of good faith on the part of police would not 
affect future deterrence because “when an officer is aware that the evidence 
will inevitably be discovered, he will try to avoid engaging in any questionable 
practice” to ensure the evidence’s admissibility.394 
Overall, the Court believed that integrity and fairness required that 
evidence which would inevitably have been discovered should be admitted at 
trial even in the case of Sixth Amendment right to counsel violations.  The 
Court noted that the purpose of the right to counsel was to promote fairness 
through the adversary process by allowing cross-examination to test the 
reliability of evidence.395  Furthermore, the presence of counsel during the trip 
from Davenport to Des Moines would have had no “bearing on the reliability 
of the body as evidence.”396  Fairness is assured only when the State and 
accused stand in the same position that they would be in had there been no 
illegalities, and “when, as here, the evidence in question would inevitably have 
been discovered without reference to the police error or misconduct, there is no 
nexus sufficient to provide a taint and the evidence is admissible.”397 
In Nix, the Court was persuaded that the discovery of the body of Pamela 
Powers and related physical evidence was inevitable.  This was largely due to 
the testimony at the suppression hearing of Agent Ruxlow of the Iowa Bureau 
of Criminal Investigation who organized a search party of around 200 
volunteers and testified that had Williams not led the police to the body the 
search would have been resumed and discovered the body in an additional 
three to five hours.  The Court therefore believed that it was clear that the body 
and additional evidence would have inevitably been discovered by lawful 
means and overturned the Eighth Circuit.398 
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Justice William Brennan wrote a short dissenting opinion in which he was 
joined by Justice Thurgood Marshall.  Justice Brennan noted that he agreed 
that due to the similarities between the independent source and inevitable 
discovery exceptions that he thought the inevitable discovery exception was 
supported by the Constitution.399  He believed, however, that in its efforts to 
weaken the exclusionary rule the Court had lost sight of one crucial difference 
between the two exceptions.  That difference being evidence found through the 
inevitable discovery exception was only hypothetically found through 
alternative legal methods.  Due to this difference he believed that the Court 
should raise the burden of proof in inevitable discovery cases from a 
preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing evidence.400 
IV.  A LEGAL SAFETY NET 
While the Court embraced the inevitable discovery exception in Nix and 
made it clear that the burden of proof was a preponderance of the evidence and 
that there was no good faith requirement, it failed to explain what form of the 
exception it was adopting.  Failure to do so may seem surprising given the 
broad discussion of this issue in the briefs put forward by Iowa and the United 
States.401  The Court gave no real indication as to whether it believed that only 
instances of what Iowa had called in its brief “independent inevitable 
discovery” should be allowed or whether it would accept a broader application 
such as the United States had urged in its brief.  The unwillingness of the Court 
to clearly explain what form of inevitable discovery it was adopting left the 
lower courts in a position in which they reserved for themselves the right to fill 
in the details.  This is illustrated by the Eleventh Circuit which wrote that Nix 
was “silent as to what constitutes ‘inevitable’ discovery under the doctrine.”402  
The inability of the Court to clarify exactly what the inevitable discovery 
exception would entail has created problems for its uniform application 
throughout the federal system. 
Within a year of the decision, Nix v. Williams had received mixed reviews 
from legal commentators.403  In the twenty-five years since the Nix decision 
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there has been a series of complaints made regarding the inevitable discovery 
exception.  These complaints have ranged from its utilization to avoid the 
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment,404 its discouragement of 
improvements in law enforcement training,405 its invitation for future abuse of 
constitutional rights,406 its use in treating both primary and derivative evidence 
the same,407 and its creation of a “chaotic state of affairs” resulting in different 
application of the exception in different circuits.408  More recently, 
commentators have focused on whether there is a need for an active pursuit of 
an alternative legal method of discovery409 and whether the exception applies 
to evidence which was illegally gathered from a third party.410  While 
examining a variety of different problems which involve the inevitable 
discovery exception, many articles use a similar formula.  First, they identify a 
problem in the application of the exception.  Next, they present a well-
reasoned solution to the problem.  Finally, they end with a call to action on the 
part of the Supreme Court to clarify the inevitable discovery exception’s 
application.411 
Despite these well-intentioned and sincere pleas for the Court to provide 
clarity in this area of law, the Court is silent.  What is missing from most of 
these analyses despite a clear pattern of behavior is a sense of reality 
concerning the Court’s view of the exclusionary rule and its social costs.  
Simply put, the Court dislikes the rule because of what it sees as its high social 
costs.  These costs include interfering in the truth finding function of trials, 
creating disrespect for the law, and, most importantly, possibly causing the 
release of individuals who have committed crimes.412  The Court’s dislike of 
the exclusionary rule is not a new revelation and has been a consistency in a 
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string of cases beginning with Calandra v. United States and continuing 
today.413  Throughout the Calandra era, scholars have noted the Court’s 
discomfort with the exclusionary rule.414 
In trying to determine why the Court has not provided clarity as to the 
proper application of the inevitable discovery exception, it may be time to stop 
being so logical and be realists.  When it comes to explaining the Court’s 
unwillingness to reexamine the parameters of the inevitable discovery doctrine, 
most of the legal scholarship has missed the mark by trying to influence the 
Court to act through persuasive legal arguments.  The reality is that this is an 
area where the Court is predisposed not to provide clarity.  What was true 
twenty-five years ago when Nix was decided remains true today.  The majority 
of the Court had a dislike of the exclusionary rule in 1984 and still does today.  
As a result, the Court continues to take moves to avoid applying it.415  The 
1984 Term which gave rise to the inevitable discovery and the good faith 
exceptions to the exclusionary rule cannot be seen as an isolated event 
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regarding the Court’s attitude toward the exclusionary rule.416  Instead, it must 
be examined as one year in a long term assault on the exclusionary rule.  In a 
series of cases running from Calandra through Hudson v. Michigan, the Court 
has made it clear that it dislikes the exclusionary rule and will seize 
opportunities to limit its use. 
It is helpful to remember that Nix v. Williams was preceded by Brewer v. 
Williams.  Every member of the Court was bothered by the result in Brewer 
and feared that the decision of the Court had the potential to cause the release 
of Robert Anthony Williams, who the Court was convinced had committed a 
heinous crime.  It did not matter if the justice was in the majority or the 
dissent, they all believed the facts to clearly be against Williams and that the 
evidence pointed to his guilt. Justice Stewart called Williams’s crime 
“senseless and brutal,” but thought that the constitutional violation was too 
blatant to ignore.417  Justice Marshall, despite seeing a clear violation of the 
law, called Williams a “dangerous criminal.”418  Justice Stevens also made 
note of Williams’s probable guilt.419  Chief Justice Burger’s statement that 
“Williams is guilty of the savage murder of a small child; no member of the 
Court contends he is not . . .” was unchallenged by the other members of the 
Court.420  Justice White added that Williams was “[a] mentally disturbed killer 
whose guilt was not in question.”421  Finally, Justice Blackmun added that, 
“The evidence of Williams’s guilt is overwhelming.”422  This frustration over 
what the majority saw as a clear violation of Williams’s Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel and the prospect that he may eventually be released helps to 
explain why Justice Stewart’s opinion suggested that Iowa proceed with the 
case against Robert Williams and make use of the inevitable discovery 
exception.423  Despite Chief Justice Burger discounting the likelihood of a 
successful retrial of Williams calling inevitable discovery an “unlikely 
theory,”424 Judge Denato noted the encouragement Justice Stewart had given 
the State to proceed in its second trial when he ruled that the body of Pamela 
Powers and the tests run on it could be used as evidence.425  When given the 
opportunity to weaken the exclusionary rule through adoption of what he had 
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called the unlikely theory of the inevitable discovery exception, Chief Justice 
Burger jumped at the chance. 
When Nix came to the Court, Justice Stewart had been replaced by Justice 
O’Connor, but all the other justices were there when Brewer was decided.  For 
these justices the only real questions they were prepared to answer were if the 
inevitable discovery exception could be supported by the Constitution and if 
the body of Pamela Powers would have been found by legal methods.  No 
other questions had to be answered because the real attractiveness of the 
inevitable discovery exception to members of the Court since its inception in 
Nix has been its flexibility to fit a wide variety of changing scenarios.  This 
flexibility creates a legal safety net by which evidence that was gathered 
through a legal violation can still be used at trial thus avoiding the social costs 
which the Court continues to believe are too high.  This legal safety net allows 
people who commit crimes to more successfully be prosecuted.  That, after all, 
was the real purpose behind the Burger Court’s exclusionary rule cases.  Chief 
Justice Burger’s opinion in Nix put it about as bluntly as he could when he 
stated: “The purpose of the inevitable discovery rule is to block setting aside 
convictions that would have been obtained without misconduct.”426 
The desire for a flexible safety net is illustrated by the Court ignoring the 
issue as to whether hypothetically discovered evidence needed to be in the 
same condition as when it was actually found.  At no place in its ruling in Nix 
did the Court make mention of a need for the body to have been inevitably 
found in the same condition as it was actually found.  Following the lead of 
Judge Denato that the freezing temperatures would have preserved the body 
and other evidence, every court which had ruled in favor of allowing the 
disputed evidence had ruled that it would have been found in essentially the 
same condition.  The Court was repeatedly made aware of this fact in the 
record and Chief Justice Burger mentioned in his majority opinion that the trial 
court, the Iowa Supreme Court, and the district court on habeas, had all ruled 
that the body would have been legally found in essentially the same condition 
had the constitutional violation not occurred.427 
The problem with an honest reliance on this finding was that Iowa had 
argued just the opposite at trial.  To be fair, it is true that the defense also 
changed its position regarding the impact that freezing temperatures had on the 
preservation of evidence at trial.  The change in positions did not play an 
important role in the appellate process, but the Court was made aware of it.  
The Respondent’s Brief made mention of both positions the State took 
regarding freezing temperatures and destruction of evidence when it discussed 
the failure of defense attorneys to call Richard Boucher as a witness at trial.  
Richard Boucher had claimed that he heard Albert Bowers’s voice and 
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suspicious noises coming from Bowers’s room in the Y.M.C.A. at the time of 
the crime and later found a bloody towel in the room after Bowers had fled.  
The Respondent’s Brief noted: 
Incredibly, the Boucher testimony was not offered at trial. . . . Bowers’ 
apparent nonsterility does not affect the relevance of the Boucher testimony.  
Of course, if the jury concluded that the perpetrator was sterile, the Boucher 
testimony would have been of relatively little value—but then the respondent 
could not have been found guilty.  On the other hand, if the jury accepted the 
prosecution’s position at trial that the absence of sperm in the semen found on 
the body was explainable by the annihilation of the sperm by the effects of 
freezing temperatures—even though the position was inconsistent with its 
position at the motion to suppress (App. 58–74)—the Boucher testimony 
would have been powerfully supportive of the respondent’s defense.428 
 The Court’s unwillingness to address whether the inevitable discovery 
exception requires evidence to be in the same condition at the point of its 
hypothetical finding versus when it was actually illegally found demonstrates 
that the Court either misunderstood the complexities of the case or ignored 
them for the purpose of creating a more flexible safety net which could be used 
to gain convictions rather than having to apply the exclusionary rule.  Because 
this decision fits a larger pattern of behavior it is more likely that the Court’s 
intent was to create a flexible safety net that could allow more evidence to be 
used at trial. 
Another example of the Court’s eagerness to adopt the inevitable discovery 
exception and create a legal safety net is that the Court failed to explain 
whether there must be an active alternative method in place that would have 
lawfully led to discovery of evidence at the time of the illegality.  Every court 
that ruled on the issue in the Williams case had found that there was an active 
lawful method of finding the body, the search party.  A close examination of 
the record reveals, however, that the search party had completed its planned for 
search of Powesheik and Jasper Counties by 3:00 p.m. and had stopped at the 
Jasper-Polk County line.  At that time, the search was suspended.  The body 
was not located in Polk County until 5:30 p.m.  It is true that Agent Ruxlow 
testified at the suppression hearing that he would have reassembled the search 
party and continued the search into the Polk County if necessary,429 but it is 
also true that he knew the reason behind his testimony was to help convince 
Judge Denato that the body would have been found through legal methods.430  
Perhaps the knowledge that at the time that Williams actually led the police to 
the body there was no active lawful alternative in place caused the Court to 
couch its finding in terms which did not necessarily require an active 
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alternative to be in place in that time of the constitutional violation.  As Chief 
Justice Burger put it, “we are satisfied . . . that the volunteer search teams 
would have resumed the search had Williams not earlier led the police to the 
body and the body inevitably would have been found.”431  By not specifically 
stating whether it was a necessity for an alternative method to be active at the 
time of the constitutional infraction, the Court created flexibility in the 
application of the inevitable discovery exception which would make it easier in 
future cases to allow use of the exception to gain convictions. 
If the legal safety net created by the inevitable discovery exception helps to 
ensure that the guilty will be removed from the streets and punished, the Court 
seems little bothered by the government’s violations of the law.  Its decision 
not to require a good faith element in the inevitable discovery exception tells 
trial courts not to examine the facts behind the constitutional infraction.  In the 
Court’s view, the violation of the Constitution is not what is important.  The 
important thing it is limiting the costs placed on society by the exclusionary 
rule and boosting the government’s ability to gain a conviction.  The same 
thing can be said by the Court’s silence as to whether the exception applies to 
primary or derivative evidence.  To the Court it does not matter whether the 
evidence is primary or derivative, it is the ability to use the illegally gained 
evidence that matters.  In regards to the inevitable discovery exception to the 
exclusionary rule, it is time for legal scholars to look beyond the need for 
consistency in legal doctrine and give attention to the consistency of result.  An 
examination which focuses on result, rather than reasoning helps to explain 
why, despite a number of opportunities, the Court has repeatedly decided not 
to clarify the exception.432  The Court has preferred to leave the inevitable 
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discovery exception flexible so that it can continue to serve as a legal safety 
net to ensure that people who seem factually guilty are convicted.  We should 
expect no changes in this approach until such time that we see changes in the 
personnel on the Court who believe that the government’s adherence to the law 
is as important as the adherence of its citizens to the laws. 
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